


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 April 1964

DAILY BRIEF

Cyprus: Intermittent fighting is continuing in the strategic Kyrenia pass area in northern Cyprus as the Greek Cypriots make preparations for what may be an all-out assault on the Turkish Cypriot position.

Firing is increasingly heavy, but has not substantially altered battle lines. The outnumbered Turkish Cypriot defenders remain firmly entrenched on the heights overlooking Kyrenia pass. UN forces in the area are being reinforced.

In Athens, talks between Makarios and Prime Minister Papandreu to unify their policies on Cyprus are continuing. The arrival there of Cypriot Minister of Interior Georkatzis, a long-time supporter of the former leader of the Greek Cypriot underground, George Grivas, has provoked new reports that he would soon return to the island to assume supreme command of the Cyprus security forces. These may now number in excess of 30,000.

If Grivas returns to the island in a command position, the Turks may seize upon his arrival as an excuse to appeal to the UN Security Council. The Turkish Cypriots have announced that they will regard Grivas' return as proof of direct Greek intervention in the Cyprus crisis.

[In Ankara, disillusionment over US policy regarding Cyprus appears to be increasing and Turkey may be about to assume a "more independent policy"]

regarding the island. The mounting Turkish pressure on the Greek community in Istanbul and in Greek-Turkish relations generally is probably part of that policy. Continued deterioration of the Turkish position could also lead ultimately to a no-confidence vote against the government.

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14 Apr 64

DAILY BRIEF

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Laos: Premier Souvanna appears primed for a new effort to reunify Laos.

Tripartite talks between his neutralist faction, General Phoumi's rightists, and the Pathet Lao headed by Prince Souphanouvong are scheduled to begin Friday at the Plaine des Jarres.

To facilitate the early return of Pathet Lao ministers to the coalition cabinet, Souvanna favors at least a temporary shift of the seat of government to apolitical Luang Prabang. He also indicates he will push for longer range implementation of the agreements of 27 November 1962 which called for an integrated national army and a tripartite police force in Vientiane.

Souvanna seems to be banking heavily on renewed Communist assurances of respect for Laos' neutrality which he received during his visits to Hanoi and Peiping earlier this month. These talks appear to have reinforced his opposition to any cooperation between General Phoumi's forces and the South Vietnamese Army. He fears this would result in strong Communist reaction.

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UK - British Guiana: [The British Labor Party is giving increasing attention to British Guiana policy.]

[According to an anti-Jagan Labor MP, several members of the party favor giving the colony independence at an early date without first holding an election based on proportional representation.]

[Frank Cousins, a prominent British union leader who recently did a survey on the colony for the party, has indicated that he is personally sympathetic to Jagan and his Peoples' Progressive Party. He is also convinced that proportional representation will only intensify the colony's racial problem, thus worsening its already severe economic difficulties.]

[John Hatch, a journalist recently returned from British Guiana, says that he intends to submit a confidential report of his observations to Harold Wilson that will favor Jagan. Wilson, who Hatch claims asked for the report, has not yet committed himself to any policy concerning the colony.]

[Registration for the election anticipated later this year has now been scheduled to take place between 8 May and 6 June. Jagan has publicly criticized the registration regulations. He has asserted his party is still undecided on whether to boycott them. He told the governor privately on 9 April, however, that he would cooperate in the elections, albeit reluctantly.]

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Southern Rhodesia: [The forced resignation of relatively moderate Prime Minister Field leaves the government in the hands of extreme right-wing whites.]

[A rightist majority within Field's Rhodesian Front party had long been dissatisfied with his leadership. In particular, the rightists felt he had not pushed Southern Rhodesia's demand for independence from Britain vigorously enough. Ian Smith, Field's successor, can be expected to press harder for independence.]

[A body of conventions and agreements with London gives the territory almost complete "de facto" independence, but the British have said formal severing of colonial ties can come only when the 3.7 million Africans have better political prospects. The present constitution assures control for many years to the country's 220,000 whites.]

[The moderate wing of the Rhodesian Front may eventually break with Smith and join the relatively liberal white opposition party.]

[Such a shift might provide a new political platform for the return to politics of Sir Roy Welensky, last premier of the defunct Rhodesian Federation and still the most popular political figure in Southern Rhodesia. Even Welensky, however, would have difficulty coping with the drift to the right in the white electorate.]

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